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Abstract
The traditional way of dealing with uncertainty in population projections through high
and low variants is unsatisfactory because it remains unclear what range of uncertainty
these alternative paths are assumed to cover. Probabilistic approaches have not yet
found their way into official population projections. This paper proposes an expert-
based probabilistic approach (random scenario approach) that seems to meet important
criteria for successful application to national and international projections: 1) it provides
significant advantages to current practice, 2) it presents an evolution of current practice
rather than a discontinuity, 3) it is scientifically sound, and 4) it is applicable to all
countries.
In a recent Nature article (Lutz et al. 1997) this method was applied to 13 world
regions. This paper discusses the applicability to national projections by directly taking
the alternative assumptions defined by the Austrian Statistical Office. Sensitivity
analyses that resolve some methodological questions about the approach are also
presented.
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1. Introduction and Approach
One major unresolved issue in population projection is how to deal with uncertainty.
There is little doubt among users and producers alike that it is meaningful to produce at
least one “medium,” or “central,” projection that is somehow considered the best
projection at the time of production. For many users such a best guess will suffice. They
typically take it as an exogenous input into their own models for school planning, social
security considerations, energy outlook, etc. These projections may turn out to be wrong
due to unforeseen circumstances, but given our knowledge today they reflect the best
assumptions we can make. Hence a medium projection should be an indispensable part
of any set of published projections.1
It has become practice by the UN and many national statistical agencies to
publish, in addition to the medium projection, “variants” that are generally based on
higher and lower fertility paths. But nowhere in the publications themselves or
elsewhere in the demographic literature can one find exact definitions of what such
“variants” actually stand for. Are they just sample paths, or do they demarcate certain
ranges? The only thing that is sometimes explicitly stated is that they should not be
interpreted as giving any sort of confidence intervals in a probabilistic sense. But this is
exactly what most users take them to be, and we cannot blame them because an
uncertainty distribution is the only logical interpretation of any set of “high,” “medium”
and “low” lines published. To an informed non-demographer, e.g., a scholar from
another scientific discipline, who is unfamiliar with the traditional practice of
demographers, an immediate question will be, whether the range given by the variants is
assumed to cover 100 percent, 90 percent, or any other proportion of all possible future
paths. But the demographic producers generally refuse to be precise about their
subjective probability distribution, and do not give the user a satisfactory answer to this
crucial question; but what should the user do with the variants if he is not told how to
interpret them?
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 In this respect the projections produced by Eurostat in 1991, which only present two scenarios without
telling the users which one to use, has presumably made a number of users unhappy.
2In addition to this lack of precision in what one is actually doing, there seem to
be two other serious problems with the traditional “variants”:
1) They are typically still only based on variations in fertility assumptions (as
spearheaded by the published UN projections) and disregard uncertainty about future
mortality and migration trends, which also impact on population size and even more
so age distributional aspects such as on the old-age dependency ratio. For such ratios
the uncertainty range due to mortality may be more significant than that due to
fertility.
2) The high/low variants presented for the total world population are based on the
assumption that in all countries of the world fertility trends simultaneously follow the
maxima/minima defined for each country.2 This is a very unreasonable assumption.
In reality, in some countries fertility will be above the assumed average, and in
others below. For the global total population size these diverging trends will partly
cancel out. Because of these compensations the global population size is by orders of
magnitude less likely to hit the value given under the “high” variant than it is in any
particular country, no matter what likelihood is assumed for each country.
What are the possible ways around such devastating problems? One can go in
either of two directions: The first approach is to explicitly call the alternative
projections sample paths or scenarios designed to demonstrate the consequences of
certain specified conditions. A constant fertility scenario is an example of this, where
there is no need to specify a probability because it is only for illustrative purposes.
Some of IIASA’s (Lutz 1994) scenarios (such as the “African Food Crisis Scenario”)
followed this direction. For the UN it would be an interesting attempt to specify a
scenario that would demonstrate the long-term impacts of a successful implementation
of the quantitative goals of the “Cairo Programme of Action” in the fields of health and
unmet need for family planning. The current “low” variant certainly does not reflect
such a scenario (since it does not assume extra efforts in health), although one
sometimes hears this association.
The other direction is to systematically consider possible deviations from the
most likely path for all three components. This can, on the one hand, be done by
applying errors from past population projections or making assumptions about variance
derived from past time series, or on the other hand, by having experts define ex ante
probability distributions. While most of the literature on probabilistic population
projections so far follows the first approach (Lee and Tuljapurkar 1994; Lee and Carter
1992; Lee 1993; Alho 1990; Alho and Spencer 1985; Keilman and Cruijsen 1992) this
contribution chooses to go the other way.
A recent article in Nature (Lutz et al. 1997) presents probabilistic world and
regional population projections that make use of expert opinion on both the trends in
fertility, mortality and migration, and on the uncertainty range of those trends. Using
simulation techniques the authors have derived distributions of population sizes and age
structures from those expert judgements. The range of uncertainty was defined in terms
of three values (central, low and high) for each component for a given year (2030)
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 The same is often true if national projections are considered to result from aggregating provincial
projections.
3where the area between “low” and “high” should cover 90 percent of all possible cases.
Due to limited space, two important methodological issues of this approach could not be
discussed in that article:
1) It needs to be studied to what degree results depend on the precision of the expert
statement about the 90 percent range; in other words, does it make much difference
if the low-high interval is alternatively taken to cover 85 percent or 95 percent?
2) Caution has been expressed (see Lee 1997) that the assumption of piece-wise linear
random paths, e.g., in Total Fertility Rates (TFR), from the starting point to the end
point underestimates the variance of the resulting population age distribution in
comparison to a presumably more realistic random path of short-term fluctuations
with some degree of autocorrelation.
These two methodological issues will be discussed using Austrian data and will,
in our view, receive satisfactory answers that suggest the method for broader
applications also in the field of national population projections. More importantly, using
the alternative assumptions of the most recent official Austrian population projections
produced by the Central Statistical Office, this paper also illustrates how these
“conventional” projections can directly be converted into a probabilistic framework that
provides a more meaningful way of stating uncertainty than the traditional way of
publishing variants. By directly taking the assumptions as already defined by national
experts for the official statistics, and simply assuming a standard normal distribution
over those fertility, mortality and migration assumptions (which happen to be
symmetric),3 we believe that this approach is a more likely candidate for
implementation by statistical offices than complex time-series based approaches that
require a number of not intuitively clear structural and parameter choices.
2. Probabilistic Population Projections for Austria
In 1996 the Austrian Central Statistical Office published a new population projection to
2050. Assumptions were defined in the usual way by discussing in an inter-agency
meeting proposals prepared by the projections unit. Because international migration has
been playing a very important role in Austria recently, the committee decided to
implement three alternative migration assumptions, namely, annual net migration gains
of 10,000, 17,000, and 24,000 to be effective in the first projection year and stay
constant during the whole projection period. In contrast to migration fertility has been
very stable in Austria over the past 15 years, with a TFR of between 1.5 and 1.4. At
present, it is at 1.4 and is assumed to increase to 1.5 by 2010 under the central
assumption. In the high and low cases it is assumed to reach 1.8 and 1.2, respectively.
Values up to 2010 are derived by linear interpolation. Beyond that fertility is kept
constant. Life expectancy for men is assumed to increase from presently 74 years to 79
years in 2030 under the central assumption (76 and 82 years under low and high). For
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 For lack of convincing alternatives, experts tend to choose symmetric distributions as the simplest case.
In case of the assumption of non-symmetry, other probability distributions can be chosen.
4women over the same period it is assumed to rise from 80 to 85 years in the central, 83
in the low and 87 in the high case.4
The combination of the three central assumptions forms the basis for the official
medium variant. Results of this projection indicate that after 2001 the balance of births
and deaths will turn negative and remain so at an ever-increasing magnitude over the
whole projection period. In 2015 the deficit will reach 1.2 /1000, in 2030 3.0/1000 and
in 2050 8.0/1000, which means an absolute deficit of more than 60,000. It is only due to
assumed net migration gains that the total population size will continue to grow from
presently 8.0 million to 8.4 million in 2025. This is projected to be the turning point
after which population will start to decline rather rapidly due to the increasing birth
deficit that then will outweigh immigration. Throughout the period population aging
will rapidly advance with the proportion above age 60 increasing from presently 19.7
percent to way above 30 percent, and the mean age of the population increasing from
presently 38.5 years to close to 50 years.
Hence, there is no doubt that Austria will experience very significant population
aging. But the extent and speed of aging crucially depends on future fertility, mortality
and migration trends. There is significant uncertainty about the future paths of these
demographic components, as already described above, through the alternative
assumptions made. Instead of discussing here the results of alternative projections
combining various assumptions, we will immediately present the results of 1000
simulation runs that randomly combine different fertility, mortality and migration paths
from the above described normal distributions for each component. This is done by
drawing a value for the target year of each component and using the linearly
interpolated values for the intermediate years (in the same way the original variants
were defined). Each simulation run is therefore based on three random draws, one for
each component, an approach that has been labeled the “random scenario approach” by
Lee (1997).
Figure 1 shows selected fractiles of the resulting distribution in total population
size. The inner 20 percent (dark shaded area) follow the path described above for the
main variant: an increase to 2025 followed by a decline in total population size. The
inner 60 percent of the resulting distribution still covers a relatively narrow range over
the next two decades, but then starts to open up markedly. In 2025 the range covers
approximately half a million potential Austrians; in 2050 it is already far above 1
million. The 95 percent interval shows a similar trumpet shape with a difference of
around 1 million in 2025 and close to 3 million in 2050. In other words, the specified
expert-based model implies that with a probability of 95 percent the Austrian population
in 2025 will lie between 7.8 and 8.9 million, and in 2050 between 6.5 and 9.2 million.
The results also show that with a probability of around 60 percent the population in
2050 will be lower than today, while in roughly 40 percent of all simulations population
size turns out to be greater than today.
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 Actually, life expectancy was the only variable where the committee initially did not define three values
but only the central and high values, because a low scenarios was not intended for calculation. Hence for
the purpose of this probabilistic projection, the low values were assumed as being symmetric to the high
values.
5To characterize the results with respect to population aging, in Figure 2 the
uncertainty distribution for the old-age dependency ratio is depicted. Unlike with
population size above there is no doubt about the direction of change. Even the lower
bound of the 95 percent interval shows significant increases in old-age dependency. The
inner 60 percent range from a doubling of the ratio to an increase by a factor of 2.4 by
the year 2050. This is a much smaller range of uncertainty than with population size
partly because the migration factor is less important. Migrants typically arrive in young
adulthood and as they age, they tend to have above-average fertility.
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Figure 1. Fractiles of resulting distribution for total population size in Austria,
1995-2050.
0.300
0.400
0.500
0.600
0.700
0.800
0.900
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Years
O
ld
 
ag
e 
de
pe
n
de
n
cy
 ra
tio
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.025
0.975
Median
Figure 2. Fractiles of resulting distribution for the old-age dependency ratio in
Austria, 1995-2050.
6The social implications of alternative degrees of population aging are likely to
be significant, at least in terms of financial difficulties of the pension system. The
Austrian pay-as-you-go system already has serious coverage problems, and receives
one-fourth of its funds from the general budget, although there are still only 31 elderly
(above age 60) for 100 adults (15-60). The median projections show an increase to
52/100 by 2025 and 69/100 in 2050. In other words, in 2050 there are likely to be 7
elderly for 10 adults in working age. Given that young men and women do not start to
contribute to the system at age 15 and education is increasing rather than declining, and
a certain proportion of that age group is not part of the labor force or unemployed, the
ratio is more likely to be in the order of one contributor to one pensioner, unless there is
a radical increase in the mean age of retirement, which in Austria is now as low as 57
years even for men.
Every percentage point in the old-age dependency ratio means that billions of
Austrian schillings are available or not available in the Austrian pension system. Hence,
for the planning of a reformed pension system, it will make some difference whether in
2040 the ratio is 64 percent or 67 percent (the inner 20 percent of the distribution). It
will make a very significant difference whether it is at 57 percent or 77 percent (the 95
percent interval). Seen in another way, these probabilistic projections can help the
designers of the new pension system to construct it in a way that it will have a certain
probability of not crashing. If the system should be viable with a probability of 80
percent, then it should be able to handle an old-age dependency ratio of 71/100 in 2040.
If politicians feel more confident with a system that will not crash in 97.5 percent of all
cases, they must make it still more efficient to handle even a dependency ratio of
77/100. Or put in still another way: If a ratio of 60/100 (which is about twice the
dependency burden of today) is the point when a given system will crash, we can derive
from our model that with a probability of 60 percent, it will have crashed by 2030 and
that there is only a probability of about 5 percent that it will not crash before 2050.
7Table 1. Resulting uncertainty distributions for population size and the old-age
dependency ratio for Austria 1995 to 2050.
A.  Total population size
Percentiles 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
2.5% 8.040 8.127 8.127 8.069 7.977 7.883 7.765 7.600 7.385 7.126 6.816 6.475
20.0% 8.040 8.141 8.181 8.189 8.166 8.140 8.088 8.000 7.880 7.713 7.506 7.264
40.0% 8.040 8.148 8.209 8.245 8.267 8.279 8.272 8.228 8.141 8.020 7.867 7.682
60.0% 8.040 8.154 8.233 8.291 8.339 8.381 8.404 8.394 8.349 8.271 8.164 8.026
80.0% 8.040 8.161 8.258 8.341 8.424 8.495 8.550 8.584 8.586 8.556 8.509 8.433
97.5% 8.040 8.173 8.306 8.443 8.583 8.726 8.859 8.970 9.055 9.121 9.174 9.219
Mean 8.040 8.151 8.220 8.265 8.299 8.322 8.327 8.300 8.236 8.139 8.013 7.855
Median 8.040 8.151 8.220 8.267 8.301 8.323 8.326 8.295 8.223 8.123 7.996 7.835
St. dev. 0.000 0.011 0.045 0.092 0.149 0.208 0.271 0.340 0.417 0.502 0.591 0.682
B.  Old-age dependency ratio
Percentiles 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
2.5% 0.315 0.321 0.348 0.360 0.378 0.416 0.483 0.550 0.578 0.569 0.566 0.554
20.0% 0.315 0.321 0.350 0.365 0.386 0.429 0.504 0.583 0.621 0.622 0.631 0.631
40.0% 0.315 0.321 0.351 0.367 0.390 0.436 0.516 0.599 0.642 0.647 0.662 0.671
60.0% 0.315 0.322 0.353 0.370 0.394 0.442 0.524 0.613 0.661 0.672 0.694 0.708
80.0% 0.315 0.322 0.354 0.372 0.398 0.448 0.536 0.632 0.689 0.706 0.736 0.763
97.5% 0.315 0.323 0.356 0.378 0.406 0.462 0.558 0.666 0.738 0.774 0.828 0.883
Mean 0.315 0.322 0.352 0.369 0.392 0.439 0.520 0.607 0.654 0.664 0.684 0.697
Median 0.315 0.322 0.352 0.369 0.392 0.439 0.519 0.606 0.651 0.659 0.677 0.688
St. dev. 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.012 0.019 0.030 0.041 0.052 0.066 0.082
Figure 3 shows the fractiles of the uncertainty distributions in 2050 for the full
age pyramid. It clearly indicates that the distribution is widest at the younger ages due to
the uncertainty about future fertility. Especially under age 25, the fertility uncertainty
enters twice because we are talking about the children of mothers still to be born.
Uncertainty is lowest between ages 55 and 70 in 2050 because these cohorts are already
born and have not yet entered the ages of highest mortality. During those higher ages
the uncertainty about future life expectancy is clearly reflected in increasing dispersion.
For many planning issues related to specific age groups this kind of representation of
future uncertainty may be more relevant than that of aggregate dependency ratios.
83. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we will address two issues that are potential points of criticism of the
above-described method of probabilistic population projections based on expert opinion.
The first issue concerns the 90 percent confidence intervals that are defined by experts
in order to specify the magnitude of fertility, mortality and migration variation. Since
some experts may not be able to provide such specific intervals we will test the
sensitivity of the results with respect to the alternative assumptions of 85 percent and 95
percent intervals.
The second issue deals with the algorithm of scenario generation and the impact
of short-term fluctuations. As has been mentioned above, we apply a random scenario
approach introduced in Lutz et al. (1996, 1997). Lee (1997), however, conjectures with
respect to this approach that it “could not possibly correctly represent the probability
distribution for the age structure (dependency ratios, for example) or for any other
measure that depends on the shapes of vital rates trajectories. ...the evidence is not yet
Figure 3.  Fractiles of resulting distributions of the Austrian age pyramid in 2050.
9in.” In order to shed more light on this issue, we tried to conduct a systematic analysis
of this question by means of simulation since the problem is difficult to solve
analytically due to the complexity of the Leslie matrix. Essentially, we compare the
results of the random scenario approach with an alternative approach based on adding
an auto-regressive random component with a given autocorrelation to the process, as
will be described in detail below.
There are several other important issues worth testing. The selection of a certain
probability distribution (normal, uniform or some asymmetric distribution) also impacts
on the results of the simulation. But since earlier sensitivity analysis (Lutz et al. 1996)
has shown that the normal and uniform distributions yield very similar results especially
in the inner 60-80 percent of the resulting distributions, the major open question is that
of asymmetric distributions. Since the assumptions defined by the Austrian Central
Statistical Office happened to be symmetric (as are the assumptions for the different
world regions in Lutz (1996)) it was decided to leave an in-depth analysis of that issue
until we encounter a well justified candidate for a clearly asymmetric distribution. But
in principle the method works as well with any specific asymmetric probability
distribution that the experts might choose.
Another general issue that will not be discussed here because it relates to any
population projection and not just to the proposed probabilistic approach (although the
question is more apparent here) is that of a possible correlation between future fertility
and mortality. Especially for countries that are in the midst of a demographic transition,
there is strong evidence for such a correlation. And as demonstrated in Lutz et al. (1996)
projection results look very different in the case of assumed correlation. In a country
like Austria that is well advanced in the transition, however, there is little basis for
assuming a non-zero correlation between fertility and mortality trends.
Let us now address the first issue, namely the effect of the width of the
confidence intervals defined by experts with respect to possible future fertility, mortality
and migration levels. Since the analysis presented above was based on the assumption
that the interval between the low and high values covers 90 percent of all future cases,
we chose for the sensitivity analysis the two alternative distributions in which the same
intervals are supposed to cover 85 percent and 95 percent. As can be expected, the
standard deviations of the randomly drawn vital rates are greater in the case of 85
percent intervals and lower in the case of 95 percent intervals.
Table 2 shows the results of this sensitivity analysis in terms of two major
output parameters, namely, total population size and the old-age dependency ratio. For
three selected years the table compares the standard deviations resulting from the three
alternative models. Because output parameters can have any kind of distribution and
standard deviations do not sufficiently describe these distributions, the table also lists
the 0.2 and 0.8 fractiles that encompass the inner 60 percent of the distribution.
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Table 2.  Results of the sensitivity analysis with respect to different assumed uncertainty
intervals (Random Scenario Model).
A.  Total population size
Assumed proportion of all cases between high and low values
85% 95%
Standard
deviation
0.2 Fractile 0.8 Fractile Standard
deviation
0.2 Fractile 0.8 Fractile
2010 0.114 8.16 8.36 0.089 8.19 8.35
2030 0.415 7.94 8.67 0.326 8.03 8.60
2050 0.821 7.14 8.58 0.649 7.31 8.42
B.  Old-age dependency ratio
2010 0.005 0.364 0.373 0.004 0.365 0.372
2030 0.038 0.575 0.639 0.028 0.582 0.632
2050 0.102 0.610 0.785 0.075 0.632 0.762
As can be expected for all points in time, the standard deviations are largest and
the differences between the fractiles greatest in the case of the assumption that only 85
percent of all possible cases lie between the high and low values for each component.
The 90 percent interval shows intermediate results, while the 95 percent assumptions
result in the smallest uncertainty range. It is interesting, however, that the difference
between the 85 percent case and the 90 percent case is generally much larger than that
between the 90 percent and 95 percent case. This holds with respect to standard
deviations and fractiles for total population size and for the old-age dependency ratio.
The reason for this lies in the fact that in the case of 85 percent, there are not only more
cases outside the given high-low range, but also the tails of the normal distribution are
disproportionally longer. As a result the differences between the 90 percent and 95
percent assumptions are insignificant by any standard. Formal t-tests on the Null-
Hypothesis of equal means show that this hypothesis cannot be rejected at any period.
This is even true for the difference between the 90 percent and the 85 percent case. In
terms of concrete population number, e.g., in 2030, the range of the inner 60 percent of
the uncertainty distribution of population size decreases from 0.73 million in case of the
85 percent assumption, to 0.58 million for the 90 percent case and 0.57 million for the
95 percent case. In terms of the old-age dependency ratio these ranges are 0.064 (85
percent), 0.050 (90 percent) and 0.050 (95 percent); here the uncertainty ranges even
turn out to be identical (to 3 decimal places) for the 90 percent and 95 percent cases.
11
Summing up the results of this sensitivity analysis, one can say that under the
conditions of the Austrian demographic regime (which is probably not very different
from other European countries), it makes practically no difference whether the defined
range between high and low projection assumptions is assumed to cover 90 percent or
95 percent of all possible cases. In case of the 85 percent assumption, the range of
uncertainty increases visibly but still not very significantly.
Let us now address the issue of the sensitivity of projection results with respect
to different approaches in scenario generation. We introduce an auto-regressive
component to our scenario in the following way. Let y(t) be a function that passes
through the mean values of corresponding demographic indicators as defined by
experts. Suppose also that σ²(T)
 
is the variance of the scenario variable defined from the
90 percent range given by experts for year T. For comparative purposes we created
scenario z(t) in the following way:
z(t)=y(t)+x(t)
where x(t) is described by a first order autoregressive process:
x(t)=αx(t-1)+ε(t)
 ,         ε(t)≈N(0,σ²ε)
For a given autocorrelation α (in our case, when the scenario was set in 5-year
time steps we selected α =0.8) we computed σ²ε in such a way that σ²z(T)=σ²(T), for time
point T for which expert data are defined, using the following equation:
σ2z(T)= σ
2
ε(1-α2T)/(1-α2)
Table 3 presents the results of this alternative model that includes fluctuation in
vital rates at a given autocorrelation of 0.8. This seems to be an appropriate value for 5-
year steps (in the case of single-year steps the corresponding values would be in the
order of 0.96) as suggested by empirical analysis of past trends in the U.S. (see Lee
1997). For comparison the results of the standard random scenario approach are given in
parentheses.
Because the assumptions, as defined by the Austrian Central Statistical Office,
are based on a linear interpolation between the current vital rates and their target values,
the implied range of uncertainty for the first projection years is extremely low. The
alternatively-defined random process does not have this restriction and therefore
produces greater standard deviations for approximately the first 20 years, as seen from
the data for 2010 in Tables 1 and 3. This underestimation of near-term variability in the
case of linear interpolation has no impact for the longer-term results, but can be
embarrassing to the publishing institutions if someone points out 2-3 years after
publication that the current fertility rate is already outside the high-low range, which at
this point is still extremely narrow. An easy fix for this is the definition of a piece-wise
linear interpolation that opens up very quickly and then moves linearly towards the
target value (as has been done by Lutz et al. 1996).
12
Table 3.  Results of the alternative model with random fluctuations (based on 90
percent, assumed to be between high and low values). Results of the standard random
scenario approach (see Table 1) are given in parentheses.
A.  Total population size
Standard deviation 0.2 Fractile 0.8 Fractile
2010 0.102  (0.092) 8.18  (8.19) 8.35  (8.34)
2030 0.267  (0.340) 8.07  (8.00) 8.53  (8.58)
2050 0.473  (0.682) 7.44  (7.26) 8.22  (8.43)
B.  Old-age dependency ratio
2010 0.008  (0.004) 0.362  (0.365) 0.376  (0.372)
2030 0.027  (0.030) 0.583  (0.583) 0.629  (0.632)
2050 0.070  (0.082) 0.635  (0.631) 0.752  (0.763)
Beyond 2020 however, the dispersion of the alternative model with random
fluctuations is consistently lower than with the standard random scenario model. The
standard deviations are clearly lower for both population size and dependency ratio in
2030 and 2050. Looking again at the inner 60 percent (the distance between the 0.2 and
0.8 fractiles) for population size the 0.58 million under the random scenario model
compared to 0.46 million under the alternative model. For the old-age dependency ratio
the difference of 0.050 under the random scenario model compares to 0.046 under the
alternative model. Hence, it is evident that in the medium to long run the random
scenario model presented and recommended here for Austria has a consistently higher
variance in the two key output parameters studied than the alternative model that
assumes random fluctuations. This can be explained intuitively by the fact that the
random scenario model has more persistent deviations from the mean, whereas the
shorter term fluctuations in the alternative model tend to cancel out their effects over
time.5
In summing up this sensitivity analysis exercise, one can say that the expressed
suspicion that the random scenario approach will systematically underestimate the
variation of output parameters does not hold in the medium and long term (and even not
in the short term, if scenario assumptions are opened up quickly at the beginning). This
has been demonstrated here using only Austrian data, but there is no reason to assume
that it is not a general property. We can therefore conclude that the random scenario
approach is clearly on the safe side in the sense that it does not underestimate variance
in either population size or age dependency.
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 A new attempt to prove this analytically at least in the asymptotic case is presently under work.
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4. Discussion: Can the Expert-Based Random Scenario
Approach be Generally Recommended to National
Statistical Institutes?
When recommending the change of a long-established tradition, the burden of proof
tends to be with those suggesting the reform. With respect to population projections this
is probably not any different. Generally, it is possible for such efforts to be successful if
four criteria are met:
1. The new practice must have clear advantages as compared to the current one.
2. It should be consistent with other work done by the producing institution, and
present an evolution along established lines rather than a discontinuity.
3. The proposed approach should be internally consistent and based on accepted
scientific work.
4. It should be practical for both the users and producers, and not cost too much.
In the following we will shortly discuss a possible application of the expert-
based random scenario approach for official national population projections in light of
these four criteria. The same arguments can also be applied to international agencies
producing population projections, i.e., primarily the UN Population Division.
First criterion:  The major advantage of probabilistic population projections is that
they provide the user with more information. This information about the likely range of
uncertainty may not be needed by all users; as discussed above, many may be satisfied
with just being given one best guess. But for users who are interested in the question of
uncertainty of future trends, a probabilistic projection clearly gives more useful
information than the usual high and low variants that do not have a clear interpretation
as either a sample path or as giving the bounds of possible trends. As indicated, such
more precise information on the degree of uncertainty is particularly relevant for
questions for which deviations from the main variant are associated with costs as, e.g.,
is the case in the social security system. It is also relevant to see that different
demographic indicators (such as dependency ratios) have a much more narrow range of
uncertainty than others. For these reasons several national statistical institutes have been
considering the production of probabilistic projections, but have had difficulties settling
on the appropriate methodology to do so.
Second criterion:  There are essentially three approaches to probabilistic population
projections that are proposed in the scientific literature: One based on the time-series
analysis of passed vital rates; one based on the analysis of past projection errors; and the
random scenario approach based on expert opinion. It is argued here that institutionally,
the third approach is the most easy to adopt for statistical offices because it is essentially
isomorphic to their current practice. It can utilize the established mechanisms of expert
committees that define the alternative assumptions, and it does not require difficult
choices associated with the first two methods as to the length of time series on which
the assumed future variance should be based, or specific past projections that should be
assumed to have the same error as the new projections. These are very difficult
questions to find a consensus answer because there are no clear criteria for choice. The
random scenario approach, on the other hand, only requires the additional assumption
14
that the values already defined cover approximately a range of 90-95 percent of all
future cases. This seems to correspond to the intuition of most experts who say that in
the specified range between high and low assumptions, they did not include very
unlikely extreme events.
Third criterion:  Better institutional acceptability of a method does not necessarily
imply that it is the better method from a scientific point of view. All three approaches
for assuming future variation in demographic trends (time series analysis, past errors
and expert opinion) are based on sound scientific work, have been published in refereed
journals, and none could be rejected on the basis of scientific scrutiny. As to the
question of internal consistency, the first two approaches typically only derive the future
variance from past trends, while for the assumption of the average level (trend), they
also refer to expert opinion. This seems to be based on the assumption that experts are
better in giving an average value than in giving a range of uncertainty. A verification of
this assumption is difficult and requires future research that goes deeply into psychology
and cognitive science. The extensive literature on Delphi methods (as summarized, e.g.,
in Linstone and Turoff (1975) or Adler and Ziglio (1996)) does not seem to address this
question explicitly, and therefore cannot resolve the issue. The third approach presented
in this paper is based on expert opinion for both the mean and the range of uncertainty,
and may therefore in a way be considered a more consistent source of assumptions. But
as long as there is no additional research on this issue, it remains a matter of taste rather
than of scientific arguments. The one condition where the fully expert-based approach is
clearly superior, is the case of countries without adequate time series data. For a large
number of developing countries, as well as for global-level projections, the fully expert-
based approach is therefore the only way to go.
Fourth criterion: The practical feasibility and cost of publishing probabilistic
projections have two aspects: production and dissemination. Once the methodological
approach is chosen, the additional production costs are virtually zero. The only thing
required is a piece of software that can perform such calculations. Since proponents of
the different approaches have functioning programs available (and presumably are
willing to share them) this is more a question of communication than of financial
resources. As to the presentation and publication of the results, the description of certain
fractiles of the distribution at different points in time is a viable solution as
demonstrated in this paper. Clearly the median or main variant should be described in
detail in the same way as it is currently being done. The fractiles could then replace the
different variants in the tabulations and graphs. For purely educational purposes, it can
sometimes be instructive to describe certain sample paths or specific scenarios such as
“constant fertility” or describe the impact of a certain trend in one component on the
total outcome. The full distribution of simulation runs should also be kept at the
producing institution, in case of specific questions for which the published fractiles may
be too wide.
We can conclude that for national statistical institutes as well as for international
agencies producing population projections, the transition from the current practice of
variants to expert-based probabilistic projections is more a question of mental and
institutional transition than of additional funds required or extensive publication to
present the results. It is the view of the authors that the random scenario approach
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presented in this paper for the case of Austria is a good candidate to facilitate this
mental and institutional transition because it is a direct extension of current practice.
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